Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe Strategic Communication Overview

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Strategic Communication in Environments of Conflict
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Project Overview

To anticipate the eventual change of leadership in Zimbabwe this document has been created for communicators and foreign policy analysts as a predictive tool for how the different external stakeholders will go about using strategic communication to complement their diplomatic missions in Zimbabwe. A document based on prognostication means there are certainly gaps in understanding and predicting how humans will drive interactions. However, using a theoretical framework from the discipline of International Relations will provide guidance on constructing this forecast. Of course, not every actor is welded to a particular theory of IR, and thus below is a starting point for analysis, not the end.

The document has been divided in three different possible scenarios that could see Robert Mugabe leave office: an election, a military coup, and his death. Each scenario is broken into the actions taken by each external actor engaged with Zimbabwe: the African Union, China, the European Union, South Africa, and the United States. For each scenario the goals, strategies, and tactics for each country are outlined, leading to where each country would target their message. Some focus on the people of Zimbabwe, the military, or the other countries in the region. For each target, the message is determined by the set of objectives each country is trying to achieve in the post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. While some covert or diplomatic action is specified, the aim of this document is to predict the public diplomacy or overt strategic communication each actor takes towards its targets. The last piece of each country’s communication plan is the way the actor will engage or react to the actions of the other 5 international entities. This is to account for the fact that no communication plan exists in a vacuum and that the best laid plans will need revising based on the actions and counter-actions of the other players on the scene.

Historical Background:

Robert Mugabe has led the Republic of Zimbabwe, first as Prime Minister then as President, since the country’s internationally recognized independence in 1980. Now 89 years old, the one time freedom fighter looks set to loose the stranglehold over his office
in the coming years, whether by the ballot box, a military coup, or death. With international actors having only engaged with Zimbabwe with Mugabe as its leader, the change in leadership will open the doors for reengagement by some in the international community, while others will seek to sustain the lucrative relationships build up during the Mugabe incumbency.

This spring, a new constitution was confirmed by referendum after the three major parties in Zimbabwe agreed on the text of the document during a regionally mediated process that began after the fraudulent elections of 2008. The Global Political Agreement, a comprehensive power sharing agreement between Mugabe’s Zimbabwean African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) political party and Morgan Tsvangarai’s rival Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its splinter group, has meant a split government for the past 5 years with Tsvangarai as Prime Minister and Mugabe as President. Now with elections to come this year after a successful referendum for a constitution, there’s another chance for political change. However, Mugabe has closed off external actors from aiding in the preparation from the polls and has excluded South Africa President Jacob Zuma, the region’s point man for the crisis\(^1\). Zimbabwe has also targeted foreign and domestic journalists in an attempt to clamp down on reporting of deals to hold off a military coup\(^2\). With this move to shield the election from international and regional scrutiny, it hints at ZANU-PF moving to secure an electoral win regardless of the vote count.

The potential for conflict is substantial based on Zimbabwe’s history of undemocratic and non-transparent elections that have seen opposition parties harassed, beaten, and killed\(^3\). Thus, the post-Mugabe era will be a moment for external actors to exert their influence through strategic communication in order to achieve a favorable result for their interests.

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International Actors

African Union
The AU has taken a much stronger role in conflict situations perpetrated by military coups. The organization has suspended Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, and Central African Republic in recent years for political or military coups. However, in Zimbabwe the AU has ceded much the political engagement with Zimbabwe to the Southern African Development Community and has given the South African Presidency, first under Thabo Mbeki and now Jacob Zuma, the lead in mediating any crisis in the region. SA leadership resulted in the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which saw a Government of National Unity (GNU) assume power in Zimbabwe, and has stabilized the economy after the US Dollar and South African Rand were adopted as national currency. With a South African as the current head of the AU Commission, any future crisis will likely see the South Africa Presidency remain the AU’s primary representative to the country.

People’s Republic of China
China’s relationship with Zimbabwe resembles many other African countries: government projects paid for with resource backed loans. With Zimbabwe’s production of diamonds as collateral, China mostly recently backed the founding of a military academy in Zimbabwe. Famously, a Chinese shipment of arms to Zimbabwe before the election crisis of 2008 was forced to return home after no Southern African nation would allow it to unload its shipment in their ports. When UN Security Council members tried to pass an arms embargo against Zimbabwe, China and Russia vetoed the draft resolution. There has been no clear evidence for how Zimbabwe pays for the arms, including assault rifles, fighter planes, and riot gear, but news organizations have speculated that access to Zimbabwe’s rich agricultural growing land and other minerals

is the government’s payment\(^7\). China has reason to fear for the security of these deals as Morgan Tsvangarai has declared that he will renegotiate the terms with China\(^8\) after the terms were highlighted during a visit from Hillary Clinton to the region\(^9\).

**European Union**

The EU has been a supporter of the agricultural sector recently, saying that its importance stems from the critical source of livelihood that it provides to a large majority in the country\(^10\). Since the formation of the GNU after the Global Political Agreement, the EU and its members have contributed over USD 1 billion in development assistance. This has included health, education, food security and sectors that promote good governance. This has resulted in some remarked harvest yields\(^11\), and a reduction in school dropouts due to a irrigation program to support rural communities\(^12\). The EU also recently withdrew the majority of their sanctions on Zimbabwe.

The investment and faith placed in the GPA by the EU means that a return to the violence that was witnessed in 2008 would be a strong black mark on the EU programs and funding. Thus the EU would place high priority on reaching a stable political and economic agreement after any crisis.

**Republic of South Africa**

As the economic powerhouse and political heavyweight of the continent, South Africa has significant economic interests in Zimbabwe as well as being acutely tuned to the spillover effects of political or economic crisis in their northern neighbor. As South

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10 [http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/business/agriculture/64966/zimbabwe-pleads-for-more-agriculture.html](http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/business/agriculture/64966/zimbabwe-pleads-for-more-agriculture.html)


Africa received the majority of refugees following the violence in 2008\textsuperscript{13}, South Africa will be primarily interested in securing political and economic stability in the country. This will also benefit the significant business interests of the governing African National Congress and their allies. South African mining companies have had a relationship with Zimbabwe since the time of Cecil Rhodes, but recently the massive diamond find at the Marange diamond fields has seen a joint venture between a South African company and the Zimbabwean government begin to operate the mine. Since 2009, South African companies have committed over 50\% of the total Foreign Direct Investment in the country totaling USD 13 billion\textsuperscript{14}. Thus, South Africa may be more interested in devising a communication plan that secures stability rather than fulfillment of democratic processes. With significant economic agreements formed under the GNU, South Africa would be wary of any political disruption.

\textbf{United States of America}

With little material interest in Zimbabwe, the US government is able to remain true to its belief in transparent democratic processes to elect a government. The United States will need to bolster its image in the region to compete with China for business and strategic partners over the next few decades. Thus, mending the image as a neo-colonial hegemon will be of critical priority. Bolstering the region’s stability will benefit Zimbabwe’s neighbors, allowing for the US to cast itself as a friend of the people rather than linked to authoritative regimes. The United States also has an interest in weakening China’s relationship with emerging African nations, as well as inhibiting their support for autocratic regimes through loans-for-resources deals. The narrative of neocolonialism is powerful\textsuperscript{15}, and by creating the appearance of China as the neo-colonial actor, the United States can secure partners in the region to act as a bulwark of Chinese intervention in the region and help rehabilitate the image of the US. Securing international support from Africa will be more crucial in coming years, whether it be UN Security Council votes, or the opening of new markets for American goods and services.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} http://www.cfr.org/africa/zimbabwe-opportunity-closer-us-south-africa-relations/p28793
\item \textsuperscript{14} http://allafrica.com/stories/201304041175.html
\item \textsuperscript{15} http://www.focac.org/eng/lydht/mtsy/t837629.htm
\end{itemize}
Scenarios

Ballot Box:

This scenario portrays the actions of the six countries and organizations if Mugabe was to leave office through an election that sees an opposition party take the vote in an election that is deemed credible by the international community.

Details: Some opinion polls have the MDC winning the upcoming election with 60% of the vote. Despite this, the outcome will be based on the effectiveness of the MDC’s campaigning to get out the vote and the level of intimidation Mugabe and ZANU-PF ramp up in the weeks leading to the election. However, the possibility still exists that Morgan Tsvangarai could win the vote and be sworn in as President. Guarding against Mugabe’s resistance to leave or the military intervening before the handover will be important for Zimbabwe, and will cause different countries to approach their post-election communication strategies differently. Importantly, nations who have had friendly relations with Mugabe will have their interests under threat of retaliation by the MDC and will need to secure a relationship with the new government as soon as possible.

Military Coup:

This scenario depicts an overthrow of the National Government, either before or after the 2013 election, by military forces. This could be a seizure against a frail Mugabe, or a Tsvangarai-led government that the military sees as a threat to their ‘ideals’.

Details: With the Zimbabwe Defense Forces seeking to keep their influence in a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, they will have a keen interest in the results of an internal ZANU-PF succession struggle or the results of an election. If the military was to sense that either outcome would be detrimental to their interests, a coup, like the one that is said to have been foiled in 2007\(^{16}\), is possible. It could then set off a power struggle between the MDC, and the ZANU-PF aligned military. MDC would be unlikely to put up

much of a military resistance. If the military does assume power, a successful communications plan will be necessary to expel them from power or to shield them from international pressure.

**Mugabe’s Death:**

This scenario presents the strategies of the six actors in the immediate aftermath of Mugabe’s death. It assumes that the new constitution has been passed in Parliament, and that Mugabe has won reelection in the 2013 vote. The scenario will respond to the political in-fighting and chaos that will ensue if Mugabe has not yet appointed his 1st Vice-President. However, this scenario is valid even if a successor assumes the office, as it will result in an unelected office holder assuming the Presidency.

Details: Mugabe’s death would see his 1st Vice-President taking the office of President with the Second Vice-President moving to the first position. However, Mugabe is not required to have a running mate on his ticket\(^\text{17} \text{18}\), and has thus pushed the decision on his successor till after the election. Thus, political competition for that post is intense between current Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa and Vice President Joice Mujuru, wife of the late General of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces\(^\text{19} \text{20}\). His death has the chance cause the most chaos in the country of the three scenarios. Even if a successor is chosen before his death, there is a possibility that recognition of this person would be questioned not only by the opposition parties, but also rivals in ZANU-PF. The strategic communications objectives of each actor would vary between a wait-and-see approach while gauging internal opinion and those would seek to play an active, but covert role, in the succession fight between ZANU-PF members.


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<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOALS</th>
<th>STRATEGIES</th>
<th>TACTICS</th>
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| • Ensure the handover to a civilian government as soon as possible  
• Ensure the adherence to the rule of law during the transition period  
• Sustain the flow of humanitarian materials to needed groups  
• Create an environment for free and transparent elections to take place | • Bring immediate pressure through economic and political sanctions  
• Motivate the international community to place restrictions on the country until elections  
• Partner with regional aid organizations to facilitate the delivery through military bottlenecks | • Use bully pulpit of the White House & State Department to deplore actions of military  
• Utilize United Nations to assert Intl. pressure through a resolution condemning the actions - impose sanctions  
• Use local diplomatic staff to establish the resolve in not dealing with an unelected government |

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<tr>
<th>COMMUNICATION TARGETS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ZIMBABWE PEOPLE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• By sending messages of strong rebuke of the coup leaders, the US can align itself with civil society movements that will protest the coup. The US will communicate that it stands for civic and basic freedoms, which are being trampled by coup leaders. This allows the US to be seen as a partner of democracy movements.</td>
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**REACTION:** The US should seek to back South Africa & its sanctions against Zimbabwean officials. American backing of the democratic process will align with the EU & AU, but the US stands to benefit only if a negotiated settlement by South Africa does not result in another power-sharing government.
**GOALS**
- To ensure the steady stream of raw materials
- To safeguard mineral rights by making sure a anti-China government doesn’t come to power
- To safeguard government contracts that Chinese companies had with Mugabe

**STRATEGIES**
- Provide cover on the intl stage for Zimbabwe to prevent sanctions
- Strengthen relationship w/ Zim’s military & provide guidance on transition to ‘civilian’ rule
- Continue to publicize ‘non-interference’ policy to the Intl community and the Zimbabwean public

**TACTICS**
- Inhibit sanctions that the United Nations considers on Zimbabwe
- Continue arms shipments and seek to secure new deals while the military is in power
- Limit connections between Chinese military equipment and their use in the coup or subsequent suppression of dissent.

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

**INTL. ORGANIZATIONS**
- Using the veto at the UN and its considerable economic clout in Africa, China can provide diplomatic cover for Zimbabwe by reiterating its non-interference stance on internal political matters. China will need to be adept at decoupling its material support for the Zimbabwean military in international media.

**ZIMBABWE MILITARY**
- China will be wary of violent suppression using Chinese supplied military equipment. The message to the coup leaders will be to consolidate their power peacefully rather through violence. China should be prepared to condemn violence only after it occurs in order to not draw scrutiny to their military deals.

**ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE**
- China has the opportunity to cast itself as a friend of Zimbabwe by comparing its non-interference policy to the historical foreign policy of Europe or the United States in Africa. By making this contrast, China can continue marketing its non-imperialist image in order to temper any anti-Chinese rhetoric that emerges.

**REACTION:** China will castigate the EU and the United States for ‘invading’ Zimbabwe’s sovereignty by issuing sanctions. China will make sure to impede any resolutions in international organizations that will clamp down on the regime’s ability to sell minerals to China.
**GOALS**
- Cause a quick return to a democratically elected government
- Secure the protection and safety of civilians

**STRATEGIES**
- Pressure the coup leaders through targeted sanctions
- Pressure Others to end military support to military
- End development support if coup leaders fail to give up power

**TACTICS**
- Reinstate sanctions that were lifted after Constitutional Referendum
- Institute new sanctions meant to target military elite
- Publicize those business or countries doing business with Zimbabwe military

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

**ZIMBABWE MILITARY**
- Imposing travel bans & freezing assets on coup leaders should be publicized quickly. Continued EU financial support should be publicly debated in order to spur a quick resolution towards a transitional government. Placing conditions on non-military inclusion in the transitional government should be made first

**FOREIGN MILITARY SUPPLIERS**
- The EU will publicize the ZDF’s arms deals to pressure those suppliers in to advising their military partners on restraint. The name & shame campaign will need to be implemented before any significant violence occurs in order to sway intl. opinion against the suppliers & attribute violence to the supplying countries.

**REGIONAL ORGS**
- The EU’s partnership with the AU and SADC will support either organizations that assumes the lead role in mediating the process. To avoid accusations of neo-colonialism, the EU should offer support to the regional efforts, but not take any appearance of leading the policy making process of either.

**REACTION:** The EU will allow African nations to make the first condemnations, but the EU should pledge solidarity with sanctioning nations quickly, and offer transition funding if the coup leaders give up power quickly
## Goals
- See democratic elections held as soon as possible

## Strategies
- Pressure Military Government
- Provide mechanisms and staff for elections and monitoring

## Tactics
- Suspend Zimbabwe from the AU
- Enact travel and economic restrictions on Military leaders
- Refuse recognition of any government appointed by Military
- Rally support of regional leadership
- Appoint a lead mediator
- Offer electoral staff and monetary support

### Communication Targets

#### Zimbabwean Military
- Through the automatic suspension, the AU will cut off the country from aid and supplies until the military steps aside. This will have collateral damage on the citizens of the country, and thus the AU will need to communicate their reasons for the complete exclusion and how Zimbabweans can pressure their government

#### Opposition Parties
- The AU needs to gain the support of the opposing political parties in order to bring them to the negotiating table. There will be reluctance on their part to engage, so while the AU must condemn the coup, they may also have to publicly hint that the MDC is holding up the transition process by not participating in talks.

#### South Africa
- The brokered GPA will have been seen as a failure if a coup takes place and thus the AU will need to ensure the continued engagement of South African politicians and public. Explaining how and why the Zimbabwe crisis directly impacts SA will be crucial in motivating their efforts to resolve the crisis permanently.

## Reaction:
The AU will call for an extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa to vote for suspension. Afterwards, the AU will designate a group of African leaders to negotiate the military leaders turnover of power. Depending on global opinion on the failure of the GPA, SA may be replaced as lead mediator.
**GOALS**
- Stabilize Zimbabwe to prevent spillover effects
- Ensure SA leadership in mediation
- Secure SA business interests

**STRATEGIES**
- Contain harmful effects of Military seizure
- Protect the flow of trade, while restricting flows of immigrants seeking refuge.
- Engage opposition party to secure their support for Zuma’s leadership

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

**MDC**
- With the opposition party unhappy with the way the GPA was negotiated by South Africa and has been wary of SA’s relationship with Mugabe, SA will have to court the MDC in order to allow SA take away kudos from another mediated settlement. Using the rhetoric that backs the MDC as

**ZIMBABWE MILITARY**
- Travel sanctions on military officials, many who own homes in SA and seek medical services too, will be implemented immediately to signal SA’s resolve in removing the military from power. Public negotiations with the coup leaders could be dangerous, but domestically, the stability of the country is priority number one.

**AFRICAN COUNTRIES**
- Frustration by other nations with South Africa proclaiming itself as the ‘Gateway’ to Africa requires SA to present itself as a good neighbor and contributor to peace and prosperity on the continent. Zimbabwe will be a chance to demonstrate & publicize the SA’s work, it will help enhance SA’s continental reputation.

**REACTION**: SA will be able to push Zimbabwe the hardest without coming under pressure from China - but SA will wait for AU mechanisms to kick into place and will lobby the AU for its continued leadership. South Africa would do well to court the US’s support and ask for financial support for refugees as it resolves the situation
**GOALS**
- Support peaceful transition of power
- Release remaining restrictions on Zimbabwe’s Economy
- Secure good relations with new government

**STRATEGIES**
- Bring attention to and highlight the transparency and fairness of the election (if it exists)
- Recognize the new government as soon as election results are released.

**TACTICS**
- Use Office of POTUS to publicly congratulate electoral winner
- Have US Mission highlight their work in supporting rule of law and electoral bodies
- Pledge increased aid
- Organize regional meeting to discuss Zim’s reintegration, economically and politically

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

**ZIMBABWE PEOPLE**
- The US Mission should publicize their past support of civil society and civil liberties as a way to bring attention to their positive impact. The lifting of restrictions on Zim’s business and the newly pledged aid package should be conveyed in a celebratory way as welcoming Zimbabwe to the international community

**WORLD AUDIENCE**
- Public congratulations by POTUS should help draw attention to the success Zimbabwe has achieved in securing a peaceful handover. This will show the world the US is behind the new government, incentivizing other nations to lend aid or support. This will aid in est. strong relations with the new govt.

**REGIONAL MEDIA/GOVTS**
- By highlighting the work the US conducted in Zimbabwe, the US can help deflect criticism of neo-colonialism by demonstrating their support for free elections. This will aid the countering of historical themes of the US toppling unfriendly regimes in Africa.

**REACTION:** The celebration of external support for Zimbabwe will align with the EU’s message, and the US can focus on remaking its image within the country. It will temper any criticisms of China’s involvement to avoid an public debate on who is the least ‘neo-colonial’.
**CHINA**

IR DISCIPLINE: Realism

**GOALS**
- To guarantee the economic relationship with the government and the military with the new govt
- Prevent backlash due to relationship with Mugabe

**STRATEGIES**
- Seek to temper anti-Chinese feelings
- Promote and create more opportunities for more Zim-China economic partnerships

**TACTICS**
- Offer to renegotiate aid packages for more lucrative terms (before being prompted)
- Promote long history of China-Zimbabwe ties
- Offer more youth scholarships and business exchanges

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

**ZIM PARLIAMENT**
- China should target this group as the new President cannot veto legislation. Thus a targeted campaign at convincing MPs the value of China’s relationship to Zim’s economy will be critical in maintaining the contracts and minerals rights established under Mugabe.

**LOCAL BIZ COMMUNITY**
- There have already been backlashes against Chinese exports in Zimbabwe, with the derogatory term Zhing-zhong coming to mean any cheap. Creating opportunities for business exchanges or partnership for Zim business with Chinese companies or in China will help temper anti-Chinese feelings.

**ZIMBABWEAN CONSUMERS**
- A public diplomacy effort to show how Chinese goods & products benefit ordinary Zimbabwean citizens will be needed to convince the public of the benefits of Chinese entrance to different economic sectors. Highlighting the job opportunities created by Chinese business will counter any xenophobic buying tendencies.

**REACTION:** China will attempt to join in the self-praise game that the US and EU employ. By highlighting Chinese business investment, China will attempt to lobby the new government for continuing Mugabe era agreements. How much China can dent anti-Chinese sentiment will be crucial in this effort.
**GOALS**
- Improve trade and political relations with new government
- Feature successes of EU agriculture and good governance programs
- Bolster Zimbabwe’s economy

**STRATEGIES**
- Highlight EU investment internally and externally
- Expand EU programs to include more recipients.
- Encourage member states to look for trading opportunities in Zimbabwe

**TACTICS**
- Increase the visibility of EU advisors and branding on successful rural projects.
- Engage with the business community through delegations to or from Europe
- Encourage the return of white farmers to the seized land

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

**INTL COMMUNITY**
- With USD 1 billion invested since 2008, the EU can trumpet their work as a success story and increase their statue as a political and developmental world actor. By showing how their projects boosted economic inflows and contributed to good governance, Zimbabwe would be a shining example for EU soft power.

**RURAL POPULATION**
- Increasing the size of the EU programs will require informing their target populations of the previous success the EU has had - thus creating demand for EU managed projects in more areas of the country and in more diverse economic sectors.

**EU BUSINESS COMMUNITY**
- With political stability returning, the EU will look to encourage non-governmental funding of projects that could boost productivity and have returns for EU companies. Promoting Zimbabwe as an EU success to the European community can repair the reputation of the EU’s acumen for economic success.

**REACTION:** The EU will be highlighting their own agenda and seeking to expand it. With no other actor needing to highlight the benefits of their investment, the EU will be looking to partner on future economic endeavors.
**GOALS**
- Celebrate the AU’s involvement in the GPA
- Use the end of Mugabe’s Regime to push for more economic integration in the region
- Observe ZANU-PF for retaliation
- Encourage renewed NGO involvement in governance

**STRATEGIES**
- Promote the AU’s involvement in mediating the crisis
- Target neighboring countries for renewed work on regional cooperation
- Advise observer delegations to remain in the country for a certain period following the election
- Host NGO and Zim Gov indaba

**TACTICS**
- Send AU delegation to inauguration
- Sponsor with SADC a new development conference seeking to remove cross-border trade barriers
- Keep AU election observes in the field to watch for ZANU-PF or military anti-government actions
- Back and encourage the voices from NGOs, and minority groups

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

**AFRICAN STATES**
- Dlamini-Zuma, the new AU Commissioner should use this event to continue her narrative of ‘fixing’ the AU as it will help improve the image of the organization as a regional mediator, rather than a support of autocrats. She should look to get future support from members states based on this success

**SADC**
- The AU has sought to first regionally integrate before continental integration. With Zimbabwe a focal point in disrupting regional harmony, the AU should press SADC for a renewed effort to work for more cross-border trade and investment.

**NGOs**
- With NGOs representing women and minority groups more active on the continent, but with little funding, the AU gain these groups as supporters if the org backs their entrance and participation into the political process in Zimbabwe

**REACTION:** There will not be another actor courting non-state stakeholders like the AU, but the success of the EU’s projects can be a model for the AU to model.
**Goals**
- Repair relationship with MDC
- Protect business interests
- Watch for ZANU-PF backlash

**Strategies**
- Send congratulations early, while keeping any mention of Mugabe’s legacy toned down
- Highlight SA business successes and inform Zim public on the sectors where SA invests
- Secure ZANU-PF allies’ stakes in business joint ventures to buy their acceptance of the new government

**Tactics**
- Remind SA businesses to support the new government, regardless of past allegiances.
- Instruct diplomatic staff to inform the new government that South Africa wishes to increase investment now that stability is achieved

**Communication Targets**

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<th>New Government</th>
<th>South African Public</th>
<th>ZANU-PF</th>
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<tr>
<td>• By celebrating Zimbabwe’s democratic success, SA can signal a renewed desired to engage and invest in the country, allowing the MDC to build a narrative that their leadership is bring economic growth to the country. Privately, advise the MDC to not threaten SA business joint ventures with Mugabe’s allies.</td>
<td>• Welcoming Zimbabweans back into the region will be important due to the previous xenophobia shown towards refugees. Explaining that political stability requires economic investment will allow the SA gov to convince their public that new investment is needed in Zimbabwe and in fact aid South African workers.</td>
<td>• There will be some parts of the ANC that feel more allied with Mugabe than the MDC government. Allowing them to make contact and assure them that they won’t have their business interests threaten will help head off any thoughts of violence towards the new government</td>
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**Reaction:** South Africa will try to soak up any praise for the GPA as it was their mediation that brought it about. Thus, South Africa will have been bought into securing political stability and will look to aid the US and the EU in convincing more business and international investment in the country.
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| • Attempt to influence the selection of the next ZANU-PF leader through incentives  
• Continue to publicly support a constitutionally mandated transfer of power  
• Understand how Zimbabwe public reacts to the turnover | • Make contact with the ZANU-PF leadership to notify them of the benefits they can accrue  
• Gauge support of the electorate for the new ZANU-PF leader | • Praise Mugabe’s liberation movement work - but suggest his death allows for country to reenter Intl community  
• Publicly support adherence to new constitution  
• Use contacts to gauge local reaction  
• Ready Regional bodies to apply pressure if public or violent succession fight erupts |

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| ZIMBABWE PEOPLE  
• Influence public opinion by not casting Mugabe is a negative light, but implying it offers Zimbabweans a chance to cast off their pariah reputation. This may influence the ZANU-PF selection if their first choice isn’t publicly supported. Public pressure may be able to cause a compromise candidate to be chosen, weakening their future electoral success. |
| ZANU-PF/MILITARY  
• Take care not to interfere in selection of a new candidate, but use private diplomatic channels to communicate preference for a candidate that can unify the country, rather than one of the two factions. If one side does appear set to win, publicly support a constitutionally mandated transition -setting the stage for future condemnations if selection deviates. |
| REGIONAL ACTORS  
• Make sure to communicate the support for a constitutionally mandated transfer of power to the region, but prepare to call for pressure to be placed on the country if the transition is usurped by political infighting. Cast skepticism that the new ZANU-PF leader will be legitimate having not been elected |

**REACTION:** Response will be muted from the US and it will attempt to form its message of support for a constitutionally mandated succession in a way that gives off no appearance of interference, or China will use that message against the US in front of the Zimbabwean public.
**Goals**
- Sustain the relationship with ZANU-PF
- Stop foreign influence on the decision making process
- Nurture relationships with both factions of ZANU-PF

**Strategies**
- Praise Mugabe’s Legacy
- Wait for internal fighting to subside before aligning with the winner
- Exert pressure on SADC to not interfere on ZANU-PF succession plan

**Tactics**
- Engage with both ZANU-PF factions to convey support
- Rebuke any nation that calls for a new election

**Communication Targets**

**Regional Governments**
- China will use its economic relationships to pressure other governments from not becoming involved in the selection process for new ZANU-PF leadership. Some countries may be reluctant to recognize an unelected leader, thus China should make known its backing for whatever person ZANU-PF selects.

**ZANU-PF**
- China will want to work with ZANU-PF following the succession fight, so it's important that China publicly backs ZANU-PF if they correctly follow the constitutional succession plan. This should cause China to advise the party that China can provide more support if the party conducts itself ‘properly’

**REACTION:** China will react swiftly to any nation’s criticisms of an unelected President leading Zimbabwe. It will use this opportunity to continue the narrative of non-interference and respecting African state sovereignty and defend Zimbabwean self-determination.
**Goals**
- Encourage an orderly transition of power
- Prevent ZANU-PF infighting from spilling over into national violence
- Gauge reaction and resolve of other actors

**Strategies**
- Use the development support provided by the EU and member states as a carrot for ZANU-PF
- Monitor government and military activities in the rural areas where EU projects are located

**Tactics**
- Publicly state that continued EU support depends on Zimbabwean politicians sticking to the new constitution
- Use the cover of their development projects to observe any violence in their regions and filter reports to watchdog NGOs

**Communication Targets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZANU-PF</th>
<th>INTL Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Use the External Action Service to release statements that acknowledges the potential for infighting and that the EU’s continued financial support and potential renewal of sanctions are contingent on the respect ZANU-PF pays to the new constitution.</td>
<td>- The EU will not want take the lead in sanctions or coercive action. It will be important to voice support for regional or continental action to allow other nations to know they’ll have EU support for actions taken against an improper actions by a ZANU-PF government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reaction**: The EU maybe the most likely to challenge China’s claim of non-interference by highlighting the increased military relationship between the country. The EU will publicly exploit this relationship if those arms are used by ZANU-PF for suppressing dissent.
**African Union**

**IR Discipline: Liberalism**

### Goals
- Avoid alienating a new ZANU-PF government
- Allow South Africa to make the controversial and stern statement

### Strategies
- Criticisms against a new regime will be tempered by the org and left to the individual member states
- Encourage South Africa to press for any mediation necessary, but publicly call for internal solutions

### Tactics
- Instruct AU organs to respect Zimbabwean sovereignty so long as the political parties stick to the new constitution
- Only observe the political situation and watch for reactions to South Africa’s public statements on the matter

### Communication Targets

**None**
- As long as the constitution is followed, the AU will respect the sovereignty of Zimbabwe. If, succession fights between ZANU-PF members breaks out into general violence, the AU will weigh suspension of Zimbabwe, but will likely continue to allow South Africa to take the lead in mediations and deciding whether to be involved in the conflict situation directly.

**Reaction:** The AU will take a wait-and-see approach like the United States. However, they will seek to publicly scold ZANU-PF if infighting breaks out. They should also note Zimbabwe’s impact on the region’s economy by telling the government that the region is watching their actions closely.
**GOALS**
- Reset relations with Zimbabwe
- Avoid disrupting strong economic relationship
- Encourage the MDC and ZANU-PF to adhere to the constitution’s succession.
- Prevent political conflict resulting in refugees

**STRATEGIES**
- Highlight the work of South African firms in the country for employment and investment
- Announce this is a new era for SA-Zim relations
- Encourage or applaud the following of the constitution’s succession

**TACTICS**
- Commemorate Mugabe’s legacy by highlighting the long history of SA-Zim beneficial relationships
- Remind the MDC that ZANU-PF will be weaker in the next election regardless of who assumes presidency
- Build a narrative of ‘evolving’ relations post-Mugabe

**COMMUNICATION TARGETS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDC</th>
<th>ZANU-PF</th>
<th>ZIM BIZ COMMUNITY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use SA trade union links to the MDC to convey SA’s preference that the MDC keep a low profile as the succession fight unfolds. Publicly applaud Zimbabwe’s constitution for anticipating this unfortunate situation to set up expectancy among the population that any deviation would bring condemnation.</td>
<td>Use the Department of International Relations and Cooperation to call for a transition based on the pre-determined process and announce that South Africa will be sending a delegation to Zim for Mugabe’s funeral. This will pay respect to Zim’s President, but also put diplomats on the ground for talks.</td>
<td>Highlighting the beneficial relationships that South African businesses provide for Zimbabwe will deflate any feelings of South Africa encroaching on Zimbabwe’s sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REACTION:** South Africa will want to see stability at all costs, and thus use strong statements to warn Zimbabwe about succession in-fighting, but it will be reluctant to become involved until violence spills over. If so, South Africa will need to rally all the actors to support them in their mediation.